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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Way Of Necessity
Hancock v. Henderson'
William Gatton owned a tract of land, which he divided in 1898
by conveying a portion to Eliza Hutchins. The tract conveyed was
bounded by the remainder of the Gatton's tract on one side, St. Thomas
Creek on another and the land of strangers on the remaining sides.
The deed to Eliza Hutchins purported to convey the property, "together
with all and every . . . appurtenances and advantages, outlets or road-
ways, to the same belonging or in any wise appertaining."' 2 Through
mesne conveyances the complainants are presently the owners of the
Hutchins tract, and the respondents are currently the owners of the
1. 236 Md. 98, 202 A2d 599 (1964).
2. Id. at 100.
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Gatton tract. There is a roadway across the respondent's property
which has been in existence since about 1911, although it has been
unused for about fifty years, and was not in existence at the time of
the grant. The complainants decided to improve their property, and
while endeavoring to clear the roadway, they were ejected by the
respondents. The complainants instituted this suit to enjoin the re-
spondents from obstructing or otherwise interfering with the use of
the right of way across the respondent's land.
The trial court granted an injunction on the grounds that "the
language used in the 'together clause' was sufficient to constitute an
express grant of a general easement which subsequently became fixed
by usage of the particular roadway."' The Maryland Court of Appeals
rejected this decision, holding that the failure to establish the exist-
ence of the roadway at the time of severance was fatal to the claim
of an express grant.' The court, however, sustained the injunction
on the grounds that the complainants were entitled to a way of neces-
sity, despite the possibility of access over St. Thomas Creek.
A way of necessity is an implied easement of a right of way,'
founded upon an ancient principle of law :' if a man grants something,
he at the same time is understood to grant that which is necessary
to the existence of the thing granted. 7 Thus a way of necessity arises
by implication where X grants' to Y a portion of his property, so
situated that the grantee has no means of ingress or egress except
over the lands of strangers or over the remaining land of X. In such
a case, the law will impliedly grant to Y a way across the land
retained by X.'
To establish the right to a way of necessity, the claimant must
prove that there existed at some point in time a unity of possession
3. Id. at 101.
4. Ibid.
5. 17A AM. JUR. Easements § 58 (1957). A way of necessity should be care-
fully distinguished from an implied easement arising from a preexisting use or a quasi-
easement. The requirements of an implied quasi-easement are these: (1) unity of
title and a subsequent conveyance; (2) apparent, visible and obvious servitude at the
time of the grant; (3) reasonable necessity," (4) continuous use. See, e.g., Parker v.
Bains, 194 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1946). A way of necessity is not founded upon a pre-
existing use or visible servitude, but is a newly created way. Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md.
301, 309 (1877). See also Adams v. Cale, 48 N.J. Super. 119, 137 A.2d 92 (App.
Div. 1957).
6. For an excellent discussion of the history and development of the common
law concepts of ways of necessity, see Simonton, Ways By Necessity, 33 W. VA. L.
REv. 64 (1926). This authority has traced the principle of law to the reign of
Edward I (1272-1307).
7. Id. at 65.
8. This note will be confined to ways of necessity arising by implied grant. Ways
of necessity also arise by implied reservation, i.e., where the grantor retains land-
locked property. The creation of ways of necessity by implied reservation is an excep-
tion to the general rule that a grantor may not derogate from the terms of his own
grant. See, e.g., 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 793 (3d ed. 1939) ; 2 THoMPsoN, REAL
PROPERTY § 362 (repl. vol. 1961). If one conveys the only portion of his land which
touches upon a public road and fails to reserve in the deed any right of way, then
he may use the land of the grantee as a way of necessity. McTavish v. Carroll, 7
Md. 352 (1855).
9. See Zimmerman v. Cockey, 118 Md. 491, 84 Ati. 743 (1912); Oliver v. Hook,
47 Md. 301 (1877). "[If a man grants me a piece of ground in the middle of his
field, he at the same time tacitly and impliedly gives me a way to come to it; and
I may cross his land for that purpose without trespass," 2 BLACKSrONE, COMMEN-
TARIES 504 (Lewis ed. 1902).
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of the allegedly dominant and servient estates, and a subsequent grant
of the dominant estate."s Where there has been no unity of possession,
there can be no way of necessity, since a way of necessity can arise
only out of the land granted or reserved by the grantor, and never out
of the land of strangers." This requirement of unity of the dominant
and servient estates does not comprehend any time limitation,' 2 for
the right to a way of necessity attaches immediately upon severance'
and may lie dormant or inchoate for an indefinite number of years
before it is utilized.' In the principal case the court looked nearly
seventy years into the past to tstablish the requisite unity of title. The
failure of the immediate grantees to assert the right to a way of neces-
sity in no way precludes the remote grantees from asserting this
right. 5 Nor is the right extinguished by non-user for the prescriptive
period, unless the non-user is accompanied by affirmative acts which
evidence an intent to abandon the easement.' 6 The right to a way of
necessity will pass without any notice thereof to all subsequent grantees
of the dominant estate, and all grantees of the servient estate will be
subject to the exercise of this right..7
The second element of the claimant's burden of proof is the proof
of a necessity. A way of necessity is only implied where the right of
way is necessary to the beneficial use of the land granted. The neces-
sity must arise upon the severance of the dominant and servient
estates;"' it cannot be created by the subsequent acts of the grantee.'
Since the existence of a way of necessity is predicated upon the exist-
ence of a necessity, the cessation of the necessity extinguishes the
right of way.20
The courts are not in complete agreement as to the amount of
necessity required. Some courts will imply a way of necessity if the
way is reasonably necessary2l to the beneficial use of the land granted.
10. Thomas v. Morgan, 113 Okla. 212, 240 P. 735, 43 A.L.R. 934 (1925) ; Bowles
v. Chapman, 180 Tenn. 321, 175 S.W.2d 313 (1943).
11. See Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301, 310 (1877).
12. See, e.g., Feofees of Grammar School in Ipswich v. Proprietors of Jeffrey's
Neck Pasture, 174 Mass. 572, 55 N.E. 462 (1899), in which the unity of title had existed
250 years prior to the successful claim of a way of necessity.
13. Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S.E.
233 (1913).
14. Logan v. Stogdale, 123 Ind. 372,24 N.E. 135, 8 L.R.A. 58 (1890).
15. Finn v. Williams, 376 Ill. 95, 33 N.E.2d 226, 133 A.L.R. 1390 (1941). The
effect of the failure of the immediate grantee to assert the right to a way of necessity
is the subject of the annotation. Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1393 (1941).
16. See Adams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. 361, 84 A. 530, 42 L.R.A. (n.s.) 741 (1912);
Knotts v. Summit Park Co., 146 Md. 234, 126 A.2d 280 (1924). As to what con-
stitutes an abandonment, see Goodman v. Brenner, 219 Mich..55, 188 N.W. 377 (1922),
and Bauman v. Wagner, 146 App. Div. 191, 130 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1911).
17. Blum v. Weston, 102 Cal. 362, 36 Pac. 778 (1894).
18. Feldstein v. Segall, 198 Md. 285, 294, 81 A.2d 610 (1950).
19. See Turner v. South & W. Improvement Co., 118 VA. 720, 88 S.E. 85 (1916),
noted in 3 VA. L. RM. 642 (1916), where plaintiff and defendant received their lands
from a common grantor and both had access to a public way. Plaintiff subsequently
sold part of his land so as to divest himself of his right of way. Held, plaintiff was
not entitled to a way of necessity across the land of defendant, since plaintiff by his
own acts had created the necessity.
20. Waubun Beach Ass'n v. Wilson, 274 Mich. 598, 265 N.W. 474, 103 A.L.R.
990 (1936). Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301 (1877).
21. See Brasington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 141 S.E. 375 (1927). Cf. Von
Meding v. Strahl, 319 Mich. 598, 30 N.W.2d 363 (1948). But see Derifield v. Maynard,
126 W. Va. 754, 30 S.E.2d 10 (1944).
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Others take the position that the way must be strictly22 or absolutely
necessary.28 The distinction is plainly one of degree, but the signifi-
cance of this degree is evident in the principal case. In this case the
dominant estate was bounded on one side by St. Thomas Creek, which
was assumed to be a nagivable waterway.2 4 Since a navigable water-
way provides a means of access, the question then becomes whether
the presence of such a means of access will bar the creation of a way
of necessity. The courts which adhere to the requirement of strict or
absolute necessity have taken the view that a way cannot be strictly
necessary if access exists over water.25 Dictum in the Maryland case
of Woelfel v. Tyng28 led some authorities to believe that the Maryland
courts would adhere to this strict view.27  In the instant case, how-
ever, the court repudiated this view, holding instead that "a way of
necessity may exist over the land of the grantor even though the
grantee's land borders on a waterway, if the water route is not available
or suitable to meet the requirements of the uses to which the property
would reasonably be put."' 28  This more moderate view has been
applied by the courts which require only a reasonable necessity. 29
Applying this view, it is difficult to imagine a land use such that a
navigable waterway would provide suitable access and thereby bar the
implication of a way of necessity.
The courts are in accord in holding that mere convenience will
not provide the basis for a way of necessity. 0 The stricter view seems
to be that no amount of inconvenience will satisfy the requirement
of necessity, if in fact another way of access exists across the claim-
ant's own property."' The courts which require only a reasonable
necessity take the position that adequate necessity exists if the degree
of inconvenience is such as to impose unreasonable limitations upon
22. Welch v. Shipman, 357 Mo. 838, 210 S.W2d 1008 (1948) ; Orr v. Kirk, 100
Cal. App. 2d 678, 224 P.2d 71 (1950).
23. Adams v. Cale, 48 N.J. Super. 119, 137 A.2d 92 (1957). Compare Jay v.
Michael, 92 Md. 198, 210, 48 Atl. 61 (1900), which held that "the necessity must be
imperative and absolute", with Zimmerman v. Cockey, 118 Md. 491, 496, 84 Atd. 743
(1912), where it was said that the test is "reasonable access."
24. The navigability of St. Thomas Creek was questionable. Hancock v. Hender-
son, 236 Md. 98, 103, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964).
25. Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 71 A.2d 92 (1950); Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124
Me. 299, 128 Atd. 285 (1925); Hildreth v. Googins, 91 Me. 227, 39 Atl. 550 (1898).
The existence of a navigable waterway barring the creation of ways of necessity is
the subject of an annotation in Annot., 38 A.L.R. 1310 (1925).
26. 221 Md. 539, 544, 158 A.2d 311, 313 (1960). The court stated, "[I]t has been
held in some cases that a way of necessity cannot be implied over contiguous lands
of a grantor, where there is access over navigable waters." The court distinguished
the earlier case of Jay v. Michael, 92 Md. 198, 48 Atl. 61 (1900), in which a way
by necessity was allowed although the land bordered on a creek. In the Jay case,
the question of the navigability of the creek and its effect on the creation of a way by
necessity was not raised.
27. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 36, at 699, n.22 (Supp. 1964); 8 MD. L. ENcyc. Ease-
ments § 21, at 573 (1960).
28. Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98, 103, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964).
29. Cookston v. Box, 109 Ohio App. 531, 160 N.E.2d 327 (1959).
30. A way of necessity will not be implied, if another route over the claimant's
property can be made at reasonable expense, even though the other road may be less
convenient, Mullins v. Ray, 232 Md. 596, 194 A.2d 311 (1963). See also cases cited
note 21 supra.
31. See also 17A Am. JU. Easements § 61 (1957), and cases cited note 22 supra.
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the use and enjoyment of the land.32 The test frequently applied to
determine whether a reasonable necessity exists is an economic test,
i.e., if the expense of utilizing another means of access would be dispro-
portionate to the value of his land, then a reasonable necessity exists.3
Regardless of the degree of necessity required, it is held that the
necessity per se does not create the right, but is merely a circumstance
from which the intent of the parties to the grant may be inferred.3
As previously noted a way of necessity is an implied easement. It is
implied by the courts to effectuate what is presumed to be the intent
of the parties - that they did not intend to render the property
inaccessible, and therefore, intended to convey a right of way.3 5 If a
contrary intent of the parties is expressed, it would seem that the
presumption of intent could not be raised.36 Cases can be found,
however, where the presumption prevails notwithstanding an apparent
absence of intent3 7 or an expressed contrary intent. In the Maryland
case of Condry v. Laurie38 a remote grantee conveyed the property,
together with an express license for ingress and egress across the
land of a stranger to the original grant. The granting of a license
was construed by the dissent to be evidence of an intent not to grant
a way of necessity. The majority was of the opinion that a way of
necessity should be implied, because "the doctrine is based upon public
policy, which is favorable to the full utilization of the land and the
presumption that the parties do not intend to render the land unfit for
occupancy." 39  If we acknowledge the view of the dissent, that the
granting of a license constituted an expression of intent, then it is
evident that the court was relying not upon the presumed intent of
the parties, but solely upon the public policy involved.
A number of authorities have recognized that the doctrine of
ways of necessity is based upon public policy,"0 but the majority of
32. See Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 12 A.2d 522 (1940); Mullins v.
Ray, 232 Md. 596, 194 A.2d 311 (1963).
33. See, e.g., Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A.2d 66 (1945), noted in 9
MD. L. R-Ev. 84 (1948).
34. Fox v. Paul, 158 Md. 379, 148 Atl. 809, 68 A.L.R. 520 (1930); Tratar v.
Rausch, 154 Ohio St. 286, 95 N.E.2d 685 (1950).
35. See Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 12 A.2d 522 (1940).
36. See, e.g., Orpin v. Morrison, 230 Mass. 590, 120 N.E. 183 (1918), which affirms
that a way of necessity will not be implied where it is shown that the parties did not
intend such a way.
37. Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S.E.
233 (1913), where the court looked to a conveyance made in 1832 to establish the
requisite unity of ownership, and then found that it was within the intent of the
parties to grant a right of way to a public highway which was not even in existence
at the time of the grant in 1832. Clearly it would have been impossible for the parties
to have intended such a grant.
38. 184 Md. 317, 41 A.2d 66 (1945), noted in 9 MD. L. Rev. 84 (1948).
39. Id. at 321, 41 A.2d at 69.
40. Stein v. Darby, 126 So. 2d 313, 319 (Fla. 1961). "Stripped of legal legerdemain,
it seems clear that in the final analysis the common law doctrine (of ways of neces-
sity) is based upon public policy, which is favorable to the full utilization of the
natural resources and against the possible loss of utility in the case of landlocked
property." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY Servitudes chap. 38, § 476, at 2983 (1944), is in
accord with the view that "the inference as to intention ... is influenced largely by
considerations of public policy in favor of land utilization."
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decisions still purport to rely upon the presumed intent of the parties."
One authority has criticized the presumed intent theory on the grounds
that it is the fictional result of the juristic thinking of the 19th century.42
He argues that the intent should be immaterial unless it is expressed,
and that the way of necessity arises "because the courts are influenced
by the social interests involved."43
The decision in the principal case, that a navigable waterway is
not a bar to a way of necessity, is plainly consonant with the public
policy theory. The court in fact restated the view articulated in
Condry v. Laurie. It is not unequivocally clear, however, that the court
has abandoned the presumed intent theory. In view of the apparent
inconsistencies and in the interest of legal realism, it is hoped that the
court will completely abandon the presumed intent theory and base
future decisions solely upon the considerations of public policy.44
41. Compare for example the number of cases cited in support of the presumed
intent theory as opposed to the public policy theory, in 28 C.J.S. Easements § 35, at
696 n.93 (1941). Similarly the same disparity of authority can be seen in 2 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPER'Y § 364, 430 n.52 (1961).
42. Simonton, Ways By Necessity, 33 W. VA. L. REv. 64, 99 (1926).
43. Ibid.
44. For a case note discussing the case of Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A.2d
66 (1945), noted in 9 MD. L. Rtv. 84 (1948), and arriving at conclusions not unlike
those contained herein, see 31 CORNELL L.Q. 516 (1946).
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